- A PROCEDURE FOR SHARING RECYCLING COSTS by José Alcalde & José Angel Silva
A PROCEDURE FOR SHARING RECYCLING COSTS
José Alcalde and José Ángel Silva
WP-AD 2000-14
Correspondence to J. Alcalde: University of Alicante. Dep. Fonaments de l’Anàlisi
Econòmica, E- 03080 Alicante, Spain. E-Mail: alcalde@merlin.fae.ua.es
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, s.a.
First Edition June 2000.
Depósito Legal: V-2091-2000
IVIE working papers o¤er in advance the results of economic research under way
in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scienti…c journals for
their …nal publication.
* The authors are grateful to Antonio Pastor for his helpfully explanations on how the
recycling processes work. We also wish to thank Miguel Ginés and Hervé Moulin for their
comments, and specially to Josep E. Peris for the many discussions we shared on the technical
proofs. This work is partially supported by DGCYT, projects PB 96–0339 and PB 97–0131,
and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas.
**University of Alicante.A PROCEDURE FOR SHARING RECYCLING COSTS
José Alcalde and José Ángel Silva
Abstract
This paper examines a situation in which the production activities of di¤erent
agents, in a common geographical location, create waste products that are either
of a similar biological or chemical composition or o¤er commercially compatible
combinations. What we propose here, therefore, is a cost-sharing model for the of
recycling of their waste products. We concentrate, however, on the speci…c case
in which the agents’ activities are heterogeneous.
We …rst examine, from a normative point of view, the cost-sharing rule, which
we shall call the multi-commodity serial (MCS) rule. We introduce a property,
that we call Cost-Based Equal Treatment, and we demonstrate that the unique
rule verifying the Serial Principle and this property is the MCS rule. We then
deal with the analysis of the agents’ strategic behavior when they are allowed to
select their own production levels, in which case the total cost is then split, in
accordance with the MCS rule. We show that there is only one Nash equilibrium,
which is obtained from an interactive elimination of dominated strategies.
Keywords: Cost Sharing Rules, Serial Cost Sharing, Dominance Solvability.
Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: C71, C72, D62, D63.
21. Introduction
Advanced societies are continually seeking economically feasible ways of reducing
on the amount of pollution they create. One of the most practical solutions is the
imposition of clean-up models (recycling) for both urban and industrial residues.
In this paper, we concentrate on the speci…c case in which the polluters, whether
consumers or …rms, are located within a given geographical area and their residues
are all sent to one common dump. In such a situation, there is generally the
possibility of converting much of their waste into “residual products” that could
be commercialized for other uses. In many industrial areas, several …rms dump
their waste matter into one common pit. In such a cases, the cost involved in the
eventual cleaning up of such sludge can be quite high. It is already well known
that several waste products from di¤erent industrial processes can be recycled
into the production of new agricultural products, principally fertilizers, which
can then be used within the same geographical area. Simply spreading such by-
products on barren areas of land would help to improve their fertility. Both the
US and the EEC impose restrictions on the dumping of industrial e­uents that
are generally based on limits to their heavy metal content. The reason given
for the imposition of such restrictions is that whilst the cleaning up of organic
matter is relative inexpensive, and in certain cases even costless, the cleaning
up of chemical wastes is generally quite expensive, especially when such residues
contain heavy metals. In other words, the clean-up cost is directly related to
the sort of chemical elements they contain. Furthermore, the composition of a
…rm’s inorganic residues correlates highly with its …eld of activity. For instance,
Chromium is found in the residues of leather-producing factories. Textiles and
toy factories produce Cadmium, Zinc, Nickel and Copper among other elements.
Whenever it is decided that the cost of cleaning up a common pit must be cov-
ered by the polluters themselves, it immediately becomes necessary to establish
just how the total cost should be split among the di¤erent agents. One prop-
erty that such a cost-sharing model should always satisfy is a sensitivity to the
proportion of each individual agents’ contribution in relation to the total cost.
The cost distribution that is …nally imposed should be directly related to the
cost involved in reducing, converting or recycling the individual residues of each
…rm. This paper focuses on the problem of designing a cost-sharing model that
re‡ects, as faithfully as possible, this desired sensitivity to each agent’s individual
contribution to the total cost.
There is a long history to the study of cost-sharing in joint-projects. The
3most common approach to the problem has been the normative study of cost-
sharing (or surplus-sharing) procedures. Cost-sharing problems can be modeled as
cooperative games with transferable utility. A viable solution for these problems,
in other words, a cost-sharing rule, would be a value function for this transferable
utility game.
The literature published so far on the matter provides us with an interesting
study of di¤erent examples of economic situations in which the key question is how
the cost of a joint-project is to be shared. Billera, Heath and Ranaan (1978) have
studied the pricing of telephone systems. Cost-sharing solutions, inspired by price
systems had be also studied for airport runways (Littlechild and Owen (1973)),
irrigation networks (Aadland and Kolpin (1998)), or public facilities (Loehman
and Whinston (1974)), among others. The reader is referred to the surveys by
Tauman (1988) or Young (1994) for more examples on this matter.
The particular model that we are interested in is the classical Aumann-Shapley
pricing model. Each individual i,i nas e to fn agents, demands qi units of some
(perfectly divisible) personalized good. Given their demands, q =( q1;:::;q i;:::;q n),
the agents should split the cost of production, according to a function C,w h o s e
domain is Rn
+.
Following this formulation of cost-sharing problems as atomless cooperative
games, Moulin and Shenker (1992) introduced the serial cost-sharing rule. The
main di¤erence between Moulin and Shenker’s model and that of Aumann-Shapley,
is that the goods that the agents demand are homogeneous in the former model,
w h e r e a st h i si sn o tn e c e s s a r i l yt h ec a s ei nt h el a t t e r .
In this paper, we re-formulate the serial cost-sharing rule and apply it to the
original Aumann-Shapley model. This problem was recently analyzed by Fried-
man and Moulin (1999). These authors present a generalization for the serial
cost-sharing rule to the case in which goods are not homogeneous. Their proposal
re‡ects the original formulation given by Aumann and Shapley (1974), based on
measuring the marginal cost along a path. The rule proposed by Friedman and
Moulin also re‡ects the serial principle implicit in the Moulin-Shenker formula.
In fact, when all of the agents’ demands coincide, the Aumann-Shapley and the
Friedman-Moulin rules propose the same proportional share of the total cost.
Loosely speaking, we can say that both of the above-mentioned mechanisms pro-
pose sharing the total cost according to the measure of the marginal cost along a
path which depends exclusively on the agents’ demands. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show
the paths for the Aumann-Shapley and the Friedman-Moulin rules in the case of
there being just two agents, and when the agents’ demands are summarized in
4the vector (3;1).
In this paper, we propose a cost-sharing procedure, which we shall call multi-
commodity serial rule, and which is formulated in accordance with the original
serial idea presented by Moulin and Shenker. This rule proposes a sharing of
the total cost by measuring the marginal cost along a path. The main di¤erence
between the interpretation of our proposal and those of Aumann-Shapley and
Friedman-Moulin, is in the way the path to be used is de…ned. Our path is
cost-dependent (as we shall explain later on), whereas the paths presented by the
above-mentioned authors are not.
The justi…cation of a certain path, for the purpose of interpretation, is made
on the basis of how heterogeneous goods should be compared. In our opinion,
one aspect that must be taken into consideration is the fact that the problem is
formulated in terms of a cost to be shared. We therefore believe that any way of
comparing the goods must be formulated in terms of the particular cost function
that characterizes the problem. Examples 2.2 and 2.3 should help us to clarify
this aspect.
Our …rst aim, therefore, is to present a cost-sharing rule that re‡ects the
comparison of heterogeneous goods according to the cost function that the agents
face. The way in which we compare two di¤erent goods is based on the cost of
producing each of these goods separately. As such, given two goods, i and j,w e
shall consider that qi units of i is equivalent to qj units of j whenever the cost of
producing only qi units of i coincides with that of producing just qj units of j.
Let us now analyze of the properties that characterize our rule. We …nd that
the multi-commodity serial rule is the only cost-sharing procedure that satis…es
Cost-Based Equal Treatment and the Serial Principle. (See Theorem 3.3). The
…rst property establishes that in the case of two goods i and j,a n dw h e nt h et w o
agents produce qi and qj respectively, they must contribute equally to the total
cost of production, assuming that qi and qj are equivalent. The second property
was formally de…ned by Sprumont (1998) and, loosely speaking, establishes that
an agent’s contribution to the total cost does not depend on the production levels
of other agents who might produce more (according to the above comparison).
The second question is the study of the agents’ behavior when the cost is
shared according to our rule. We propose a model in which the agents decide their
own individual production levels and the total cost is shared according the multi-
commodity serial rule. When the agents behave strategically, we show that there
can only be an equilibrium outcome after an iterative elimination of the dominated
strategies. This result is similar to the strategic conclusions for the serial cost-
5sharing in Moulin and Shenker (1992), when agents produce homogeneous goods.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic
model and de…nitions. In section 3 we present a formal de…nition for the multi-
commodity serial rule and characterize it as the only cost-sharing rule that satis…es
Cost-Based Equal Treatment and the Serial Principle. A study of the agents’
strategic behavior is done in Section 4, our conclusions are presented in Section
5, and …nally, some technical proofs are given in Appendix 1.
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Figure 1.1: Aumann-Shapley Path
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Figure 1.2: Friedman-Moulin Path
2. The framework
Let N = f1;:::;i;:::;ng be a …nite, non-empty set of agents, who we shall
also call …rms. Each agent i produces a certain good, such that, given a vector
of agents’ production q 2 Rn
+, we can identify its i-th component with agent
i’s production level. As a consequence of the agents’ production activities, the
environment is being polluted and a clean-up plan is imposed, the cost of which
will be divided among the agents who generate the wastes. Let C : Rn
+ ! R be a
function which associates the cost of recycling the residuals with the production
level of each …rm. We assume that C is continuous, strictly increasing in each
good i, C (0) = 0 and limqi!1 Ci(q) = limqj!1 Cj(q) for each i, j 2 N,w h e r e
Ch(q) is the evaluation of function C at the point whose h-th component is qh,a n d
all other components, except the h-th, is zero. Note that Ch(q) can be interpreted
as the cost of producing only agent h’s demand, regardless of the other agents’
demands, so that we refer to this expression as agent h’s stand-alone cost at q.
Let C denote the set of functions that satisfy the above properties.
Given a cost-sharing problem - i.e. a cost function C, and the …rms’ production
levels q- we shall now propose a cost-sharing method for the recycling the agents’
residuals based on their production levels. So, we shall describe a vector x =
8(x1;:::;x i;:::;x n) such that
P
i2N xi = C (q). Our main interest is in de…ning a
general procedure that provides a solution to any speci…c cost-sharing problem.
These procedures are known as sharing rules.
De…nition 2.1. A sharing rule is a function X : C£Rn
+ ! Rn that associates a




i2N Xi (C;q)=C (q).
The choice of a given cost-sharing procedure is generally based on the prop-
erties it satis…es. In this section, we shall present two properties, both of which
can be de…ned as the result of a comparison of di¤erent schemes, by the agents,
based on their production levels, to ensure its fair treatment. As we shall see (in
Theorem 3.3), both properties, together, characterize the multi-commodity serial
rule. This way of splitting the total cost can be considered an extension of Serial
Cost Sharing (Moulin and Shenker (1992)) to the case of heterogeneous demands.
In the case of homogeneous goods, it is usually assumed that cost sharing
mechanisms have to satisfy a symmetry property, namely: if two agents’ demands
coincide, then they should have the same share of the cost. This comparison
can not be extended, in a trivial way, to the heterogeneous case, although we
shall propose that the cost function does provide us with a way of making such
comparisons. In general, when agents have to share the cost of joint-consumption,
it is quite common for the agents to use the cost of their own consumption to argue
how much each one should pay. Furthermore, no agent agrees to pay more share
of the cost than any other whose consumption is more expensive that her own
consumption. In accordance with our notation, we shall state the following axiom:
Axiom 1. :L e tX be a cost-sharing rule. We shall say that it satis…es Cost-
Based Equal Treatment (CBET) if, and only if, Xi(C;q)=Xj (C;q) for all cost
functions C 2Cand production levels q 2 Rn
+ such that Ci (q)=Cj (q).
Note that, in the case of homogenous goods, symmetry and CBET are equiv-
alent terms. It seems natural, therefore, to take the cost function of each agent
as a value for the comparison of their demands. In our novel way making these
comparisons, we assume that two agents’ demands are equivalent whenever the
cost of producing each one’s individual demands is the same, regardless of the
cost of the other agents’ productions.
The following examples demonstrate that the Aumann-Shapley Friedman-
Moulin cost-sharing rules fail to satisfy CBET.
9Example 2.2. Let N = f1;2g, and let the cost function be C (q1;q 2)=( q1 +3 q2)
2.
It is clear that, by observing the symmetry notion in the case of homogeneous
goods, the total cost should be split equally whenever q1 =3 q2. In fact, this is also
the case with the Aumann-Shapley rule, although it is not so with the Friedman-













1 (C; ¹ q)=X
AS
2 (C; ¹ q)=1 8
The Friedman-Moulin rule, however, taking into account the fact that ¹ q1 > ¹ q2,w e
obtain the following expression:
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FM

















1 (C; ¹ q)=2 4 ,a n dX
FM
2 (C; ¹ q)=1 2
Note that the above example shows that the Friedman-Moulin rule does not
satisfy re-scaling, i.e., the way in which the cost is shared depends on the type
of units that are chosen to measure the levels of output. (For a formal de…nition
of this property, the reader is referred to Axiom 3 in Tauman (1988) tauman.)
It is well known that the Aumann-Shapley rule satis…es this property. This is
no longer true, however, when the form in which two di¤erent measurements are
related is not linear, as the next example demonstrates:
Example 2.3. Let N = f1;2g, and let the cost function be C (q1;q 2)=( q1 + q2
2)
2.
We can assume that q1 units of good 1 produce the same amount of pollution as
q2
2 units of good 2. The same argument that is used to justify the property of
symmetry in the homogeneous case can be used to argue that the total cost should
be split equally among the two agents whenever q1 = q2
2. This property, however,
is not satis…ed by the Aumann-Shapley rule. To demonstrate this, let us assume
that ¹ q =( 4 ;2).T h es h a r ep r o p o s e db yt h ea b o v er u l ei st h e r e f o r e :
X
AS





2 (C; ¹ q)=
112
3
10As we shall see (Theorem 3.3) the multi-commodity serial rule satis…es Cost-Based
Equal Treatment.
The second property that we deal with is the Serial Principle. This property
was formally introduced by Sprumont (1998). The underlying idea of this axiom
is the inter-personal comparisons made by the di¤erent agents among themselves,
regarding the cost-sharing. We now present the intuition beyond this principle.
Assuming that the agents use the cost function as a tool to made such comparisons;
let us study the case of an agent who produces a certain quantity qi,w h i c h ,i n
turn, generates an external e¤ect, in term of costs, to the others. The question
to be settled is just how much each agent should accept to pay considering the
externalities caused by that one agent. Notice that these externalities depend
not only on this agent’s demand, but also does on others’ demands. This fact
induces to consider reasonable that the share of the total cost corresponding to
this agent would not be sensitive to increases on others’ demands, when they are
(comparatively) higher than the one made by such an agent.
Axiom 2. Let X be a cost-sharing rule. We say that it satis…es the Serial Prin-
ciple (SP) if, and only if, for each agent i 2 N, each cost function C 2Cand any










j ¸ qj for all j such that Xj (C;q) ¸ Xi (C;q)
ª
imply that Xi (C;q)=Xi (C;q0).
3. The Multi-Commodity Serial Rule: De…nition and Char-
acterization
In this section we introduce the multi-commodity serial cost-sharing rule, and
show that this is the only cost-sharing rule that satis…es CBET and SP, the two
axioms introduced in the previous section. Before introducing our rule, however,
we must present an additional notation. Given q and q0 2 Rn,l e tq ^ q0 denote
the minimum among these vectors, i.e., q ^ q0 = q00 such that, for each i, q00
i =
minfqi;q0
ig.G i v e n q 2 Rn
+, and agent i,l e tLi (q)=fj 2 N : Cj (q) <C i (q)g.
11Finally, for each q in Rn
+, and agent i,l e tqe
i 2 Rn
+ denote the vector that satis…es
Cj (qe
i)=Ci(q) for all j 2 N.1
De…nition 3.1. The multi-commodity serial cost-sharing rule is a function Xmcs :
C£Rn
+ ! Rn which associates a vector Xmcs (C;q) to each cost function C in C,
and to each production level q 2 Rn



























The formula used to describe the multi-commodity serial rule in the above
expression can be explained in a simple, intuitive way, with the help of an iterative
argument. Let us assume that q is such that C1 (q) · :::· Ci (q) · :::· Cn (q).
In such a case, each agent has to pay 1
nC (qe
1). Note, however, that this does not
cover the total cost. The di¤erence, C (q) ¡ C (qe
1), is …nally covered by all the
agents except …rm 1. To share this de…cit among them, each agent from 2 to n,
is charged an extra 1
n¡1 [C (qe
2 ^ q) ¡ C (qe
1)]. It is clear that, in general, the total
cost is not readily covered. The part that remains to be paid, C (q) ¡ C (qe
2 ^ q),
m u s tt h e r e f o r eb ec h a r g e dt oa g e n t s3 to n, complying with the above criterion. In
other words, these agents must be charged an extra 1
n¡2 [C (qe
3 ^ q) ¡ C (qe
2 ^ q)],
which is the di¤erence between the total cost paid by agents from 4 to n,a n ds o
forth. The next example will clarify this procedure.





3 + q1q2 + q1q3 + q2q3,
and q =( 9 ;16;1). I ns u c hac a s e ,C3 (q) <C 1 (q) <C 2 (q). qe







2 =( 1 6 ;16;2). Then, each agent is charged 1
3C (qe
3)=2 . But agents 1
and 2 have also got to pay 1
2 [C (qe
1 ^ q) ¡ C (qe
3)] = 1
2 [C (9;9;1) ¡ C (1;1;1)] = 50,
and …nally, agent 2 is also charged the remainder of the outstanding cost, which
is, C (qe
2 ^ q) ¡ C (qe
1 ^ q)=C (9;16;1) ¡ C (9;9;1) = 71. Then,
X
mcs (C;q)=( 2+5 0 ;2+5 0+7 1 ;2) = (52;123;2)
The next theorem characterizes the multi-commodity serial rule by axioms 1
and 2.
1Under the assumptions made on C, for any cost function C 2C ,e a c ha g e n ti 2 N, and any
production level for this agent qi, qe
i is always unique.
12Theorem 3.3. The multi-commodity serial rule is the only cost-sharing rule that
satis…es CBET and SP in C.
Proof. It is clear that the multi-commodity serial rule veri…es the two ax-
ioms.
On the other hand, let X : C£Rn
+ ! Rn be a cost sharing rule satisfying axioms
1 and 2. To demonstrate that there is no other rule but the multi-commodity serial
rule that satis…es these two axioms, we shall proceed by induction. Let q 2 Rn
+ be
a vector of agents’ demands and C 2Ca cost function. Without loss of generality,
and for notational convenience, let us …rst assume that
C1 (q) · :::· Ci (q) · :::· Cn(q). (3.2)
This assumption implies that qe
1 5 q,2 hence SP means that X1 (C;q)=X1 (C;qe
1).
Moreover, CBET implies that X1 (C;qe
1)=1
nC (qe








1) for any q
0 = q
e
1 such that q
0
1 = q1
Now, consider the vector qe
2^q. In this vector, the …rst component coincides with
q1 whereas the other components coincide with those of qe
2.B yS P ,w ek n o wt h a t
X2 (C;q)=X2 (C;qe
2 ^ q).F u r t h e r m o r e ,b yC B E T ,Xi (C;qe
2 ^ q)=X2 (C;qe
2 ^ q)










X1 (C;q)+( n ¡ 1)X2 (C;qe
2 ^ q), so that by considering Agent 1’s contribution,




























and, following the convention that qe
















2We use the following notation for vectorial comparissons. q 5 q0 means that qi · q
0
i for all
i; q · q0means that qi · q
0
i for all i,a n dqj <q
0




















Let us argue what the share of agent h should be. Note that, by Axiom 2,
Xh (C;q)=Xh (C;qe
h ^ q). Hence, by Axiom 1, Xj (C;qe
h ^ q)=Xh (C;qe
h ^ q)
for all j ¸ h.S i n c eC (qe




h ^ q).S o ,
Xh (C;qe









. Hence, by the induction










































which is the expression of the multi-commodity serial cost sharing rule given in
De…nition 3.1
4. Strategic Behavior and the Multi-Commodity Serial Rule
The previous section has shown that, based on the agents’ production levels, the
share of their cost, in accordance with the multi-commodity serial rule, satis…es
some nice properties, with regard to the equity aspect. It tells us nothing, however,
about how the agents select their own production levels. In this section, we shall
do a game-theoretical study of the agents’ production decisions. Let us imagine
that each agent decides its own output level, and let us assume that the total
cost is shared in accompliance with the multi-commodity serial rule, and this is
unanimously accepted by all the agents. The question that arises is: Is it possible
to know the production level that each will have? Or, more precisely, is there
a theoretical game analysis of agents’ behavior that could provide us with an
accurate prediction of the agents’ individual choices? This section will provide
positive answers to both of these questions.
We shall now describe the mechanism that the agents face. As assumed in Sec-
tion 2, there is a set N of …rms which produce n di¤erent goods and face a cost
14function C in C. Each agent has preferences de…ned on R2
+. A bundle for agent
i, (qi;x i) is interpreted as the situation in which …rm i produces qi and has to
assume a cost of xi units. Agent i’s preferences are assumed to be non-decreasing
in qi,n o n - i n c r e a s i n gi nxi, nowhere locally satiated, continuous, convex and rep-
resentable by utility functions. We shall denote the set of preference orderings
we have just de…ned by U. We shall use, throughout, a utility representation
Ui (qi;x i) instead of the cumbersome binary relation notation. Finally, we shall
introduce some additional assumptions relating to the cost function and to the
agents’ preferences:
Assumption 1. C is a smooth and strictly convex function.
Assumption 2. C satis…es cross-monotonicity, i.e., for each ¹ q 2 Rl
++,a n da n y
two agents i and j in N,
@C
@qi
(¹ q) is increassing in qj (4.1)
Assumption 3. The utility function is bounded: For each agent i, there exists
a production level, say ^ qi such that
Ui (^ qi;C i (^ q
e
i)) <U i (0;0)
We must comment, here, on our assumptions. Convexity is also assumed in
Moulin and Shenker (1992) serial, and it guarantees the existence of a best-reply
correspondence for each agent. Smoothness is a technical assumption, which is
adopted to simplify the proofs presented in this section. Remark 1 in the Ap-
pendix 1 provides arguments on how to proceed with these proofs in non-smooth
environments. Assumption 2 only imposes that each agent’s marginal cost must
increase when the another’s demand increases. Note that Assumption 2 is satis-
…ed by polynomial cost functions satisfying monotonicity and convexity. Finally,
with regard to Assumption 3, we must note that it is not a strong assumption. To
be more speci…c, it is only satis…ed when the cost function is not upper-bounded,
(i.e., for each agent i, limqi!1 Ci (q)=1).
We shall now study the agents’ behavior when they are faced with the multi-
commodity serial cost-sharing mechanism, and individual strategies are based
on their own demands. In other words, given N, the set of agents with util-
ity functions Ui in U, and a …xed cost function C in C we de…ne the game
¡(C;U1;:::;U i;:::;U n), in which each …rm i selects an output level qi.E a c h
15agent’s strategy space is therefore R+. Finally, given a vector of agents’ strategies,
q, each agent i pays Xmcs
i (C;q) and obtains an utility level of Ui(qi;Xmcs
i (C;q)).
Moulin and Shenker (1992), analyze the case of homogeneous goods and show
the existence of cost sharing mechanisms, inducing dominance solvable game
forms. They de…ne a cost-sharing rule, which they call a serial rule, and which
coincides with the multi-commodity serial rule when goods are homogeneous. Our
next result extends this same idea to the case of heterogeneous goods.
Theorem 4.1. Let C be a cost function in C, and let us assume that each agent’s
utility function Ui is in U. Under assumptions 1-3, the game ¡(C;U1;:::;U i;:::;U n)
is dominance solvable.3
Before providing a formal proof of Theorem 4.1, we shall provide two lem-
mas that are essential to our argument for the construction of a sophisticated
equilibrium of ¡(C;U1;:::;U i;:::;U n).
Lemma 4.2. (Moulin and Shenker (1992))
Let h1 (¸) and h2 (¸) be two increasing and strictly convex functions, form R+
into itself, and which coincide up to ¸0,
h1 (¸)=h2 (¸) for all ¸, 0 · ¸ · ¸0.
For every utility function Ui in U, the (unique) maximizers of Ui (¸;hj (¸)) on
R+, denoted by ¸j, j =1 ;2; are on the same side of ¸0,
¸1 ¸ ¸0 () ¸2 ¸ ¸0,a n d¸1 = ¸0 () ¸2 = ¸0
Before enunciating the next lemma, let us introduce another notation. Let i be
an agent, S a set of agents, ;µS µ Nnfig,a n dl e t¹ q be a production level. We
shall now construct the function G : R+ ! Rn
+ which selects, for any production
level of Agent i,s a yqi, a vector whose j-th component is qe
ij,t h ej-th component
of qe
i,i fj does not belong to S, and the minimum between ¹ qj and qe
ij if j 2 S.
3Dominance Solvability was …rst introduced by Moulin (1979). This equilibrium concept
is a special case of sophisticated equilibria, introduced by Farquharson (1969). The idea of
dominance solvability for a game is that the Nash equilibrium outcome is unique under iter-
ated elimination of dominated strategies. The reader is referred to Moulin (1979) for a formal
de…nition.
16Lemma 4.3. Let C be a cost function in C that satis…es Assumption 1. Then,
for each set of agents S, ;µS µ Nnfig, and production level ¹ q, the function f
de…ned by f (qi)=Xmcs
i (C;G(qi)) is a continuous and strictly convex function
on qi.
Note that continuity of the multi-commodity serial rule comes from the con-
tinuity of the cost function and the expression 3.1. Strict convexity of f comes
from the strict convexity of C. A formal proof of this strict convexity is provided
in Appendix 1.
We can now present a formal proof of Theorem 4.1. But let us …rst introduce
the following notation. Let qi 2 R. We shall denote by q1
i a vector whose i-th
component is qi and is in…nity for all the others.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Throughout the proof, C will be a strictly convex function in C, and utility
functions (U1;:::;U i;:::;U n) in Un. We …rst de…ne, inductively, an outcome
(^ qi; ^ xi), i 2 N,a n dw es h o wt h a t^ q =( ^ q1;:::;^ qn) is a Nash Equilibrium for the
game ¡(C;U1;:::;U i;:::;U n). We then show that there is only one outcome left
after the successive elimination of strictly dominated strategies in that game.








Let us choose the agent i with the lowest Ci (qe
i1), whom we shall denote by ¼1.






, and solve (for all agents except

























coincide up to ^ qe
¼1,
and are strictly convex with respect to qi, we can apply Lemma 4.2. We therefore
observe that the unique solution, namely qi2 , cannot be smaller than qi1.
We now choose an agent i in N n ¼1 whose solution to Program (4.3) has the
lowest Ci (qe
i2) a n dw ed e n o t et h i sa g e n tb y¼2.W es e t^ q¼2 as the corresponding








To complete the inductive argument, let us assume that we have constructed
the sequence
¡
^ q¼i; ^ x¼i
¢
up to i = k. We now compute, for all i in N n
k S
j=1
¼j ,t h e







































. This follows from Lemma 4.2. We take ^ q¼k+1 as the solution to












We now verify that ^ q is a Nash Equilibrium of ¡(C;U1;:::;U i;:::;U n).L e t
us now select a player i and consider the two functions


































Note that these two functions coincide at [0; ^ qi].F u r t h e r m o r e ^ qi maximizes
Ui (¸i;h 1 (¸i)) on R+. Thus Lemma 4.2 implies that ^ qi also maximizes Ui (¸i;h 2 (¸i))
on R+, which is the Nash equilibrium property we require.
We shall now show that ^ q is the only outcome that is left after the successive
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. It is now su¢cient to construct, for
each agent i, a decreasing sequence of closed intervals Iiº of vanishing length:





such that every strategy in R+ n Ii0 is strictly dominated in the initial game
¡(C;U1;:::;U i;:::;U n) and where a strategy in Iiº nIi(º+1) is strictly dominated
when each agent’s strategy in that game is restricted to Iiº.
Since the agents’ preferences are convex, and C is strictly convex, it holds that
for each agent there is only one production level, ~ qi0 > 0, such that Ui(~ qi0;C i(~ qe
i0)) =
Ui (0;0). Let us de…ne Ii0 =[ ai0;b i0]=[ 0 ; ~ qi0].
Clearly, any strategy qi for agent i that is greater than ~ qi0 is dominated by
her strategy q0
i =0 . T h i si sb e c a u s eUi (qi;C i(qe
i)) must be decreasing in ~ qi0,
and, since C satis…es cross-monotonicity, Ci (qe
i) · Xmcs
i (C; ¹ q) for any ¹ q such that
¹ qi = qi.
18The sequence Iiº is now de…ned inductively as follows:



























































. Therefore her strategy qiº which solves the right-hand
side of (4.5), strictly dominates any strategy below ai(º+1) or above bi(º+1).O n e
can easily observe, by induction, that aiº is non-decreasing in º,t h a tbiº is non-
increasing in º,a n dt h a taiº · qiº · biº.
Let ai (bi)d e n o t et h el i m i to faiº (biº respect.), as º tends to in…nity. By
continuity of the utilities and of Xmcs, Property (4.5) is maintained at the limit.






























We shall now verify that a = b. Let us …rst choose an agent with (one of) the
lowest value Ci (ae





































































Hence, from (4.6), a¼1 maximizes U¼1 (¸¼1;h 2 (¸¼1)) on R+. By Lemma 4.2,











,h e n c ea¼1 = b¼1,a sd e s i r e d .
19The proof of ai = bi follows from an induction argument. Let there be an i such































for all ¸i in [0;a i]. The above argument can be repli-
cated to show that ai = bi.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the problem of how the cost of recycling the residuals
generated by several …rms should be assigned. We have examined the problem
from both, an axiomatic approach and a game theoretical approach.
The …rst question that we dealt with is how heterogeneous goods should be
compared. Our proposal is the adoption of the cost function as the key to the
comparison of di¤erent production levels. The main justi…cation for this is the
very nature of the problem: Since we have to share production costs, the particular
functional properties of the cost function cannot be forgotten when comparing
production levels. In keeping with this concept, we have proposed a cost-sharing
rule that re‡ects the general idea of considering equivalent production levels that
are associated to the same production cost.
We adapted the underlying idea of two classical properties, relative to equity
in sharing costs, to the case in which comparisons are cost-dependent (in the
sense that we explained above), and formulated the notions of Cost-Based Equal
Treatment and the Serial Principle. Our study of such properties has shown that
there is only one accurate method of sharing the cost of recycling residuals. We
call this model the multi-commodity serial rule.
Finally, we examined the agents’ behavior when each …rm selects its own
production level and knows that the total cost will be shared in accordance with
the multi-commodity serial rule. We …nd that there is only one production level
supported by an equilibrium.
6. Appendix 1
Axiom 2 introduced the notation of qe
i as the production vector in which …rm
i considers that all the other …rms produce at the same level as it does. We
now show that, under Assumption 1, the function that selects, for each qi,t h e
production level for …rm i, the vector qe
i is di¤erentiable.
20Lemma 6.1. Let C b eas m o o t hf u n c t i o ni nC,a n dl e tE : R+ ! Rn be such
that for any ® ¸ 0, Ei (®)=®,a n dCi (E (®)) = Cj (E (®)),f o re a c hj. Then,
each Ej is di¤erentiable in R++.
Proof. Let us now construct the auxiliary function F : Rn
+ ! R, de…ned by
F (q)=Ci (q) ¡ Cj (q).N o t e t h a t F (q)=0if, and only if, qj = Ej (qi).F u r -
thermore, since C is strictly increasing and di¤erentiable, we have that, for any








for any q and h. We can therefore apply the Theorem of the implicit function at
the surface F (q)=0 . By observing that F (q)=0if, and only if, qj = Ej (qi),
the result follows.
Lemma 6.2. Let ¹ q 2 Rn
+,a n dl e tS be a set of …rms, ;µS ½ N, such that
i= 2 S. Consider now, the function ~ E : R+ ! Rn be such that for any ® ¸ 0,
~ Ej (®)=Ej (®),f o re a c hj in NnS,a n d ~ Eh(®)=¹ qh for each h 2 S.T h e n ,t h e




is convex for any smooth and
strictly convex function C in C.
Proof. We shall show that Á is always locally convex. This fact guarantees the
convexity of such a function.
First, note that by Lemma 6.1, ~ Ej is di¤erentiable for each j in S. This implies
that, for any ¹ ®,
~ Ej (¹ ® + t) ¡ ~ Ej (¹ ®) ¼
d ~ Ej (¹ ®)
d®
t
for every µ su¢ciently small, and t 2 ]¹ ® ¡ µ; ¹ ® + µ[.F u r t h e r m o r e ,s i n c eC is strict
convex, we have that, for each t and ¹ ®,
Á(¹ ® + t) ¡ Á(¹ ®)=C
³
























~ E (¹ ®)
´
@qj






Function Á is, therefore, a local convex function for all ¹ ®, which means that it
is convex.
Lemma 6.3. Let f1 and f2 be two strictly increasing, di¤erentiable and strictly
convex functions applying R+ in R.L e ta be such that f1(a)=f2(a) and f2(x) <
f1(x) for each x<a . Then, the function f : R+ ! R de…ned by
f (x)=
½
f1(x) if x · a
f2(x) if x ¸ a
is strictly convex.
Proof. We should …rst note that, since f2(x) <f 1(x) for each x<a , the function







Let us now construct the function
g1 (x)=
½
f1(x) if x · a
f1(a)+
df 1(a)
dx (x ¡ a) if x ¸ a
Note that such a function is convex, and strictly convex for x<a .M o r e o v e r ,
since f2 is strictly convex, we have that




and, for x>a , and by considering Expression (6:1),w eh a v et h a t
f2 (x) ¸ f2(a)+
df 1(a)
dx
(x ¡ a)=g1 (x).
22Function f can therefore be expressed by
f (x)=m a xfg1 (x);f 2 (x)g
w h i c hi sc o n v e xb yt h ec o n v e x i t yo fg1 and f2.S t r i c t c o n v e x i t y c o m e s f r o m t h e
fact that this property is satis…ed by g1 for x<aand f2 for values of x that are
greater than a.
We can now provide a formal proof of Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.
Let ¹ q 2 Rn
+ be a production vector, and let S be a set of …rms, ;µS ½ N,


















We shall show that f is strictly convex for any set S. We shall proceed by induction
on the cardinality of S.








Now, by applying Lemma 6.2, we have that f is strictly convex in qi.
Let us now suppose that S contains only one agent. Without loss of generality,








n¡1 [C (¹ q1
1 ^ qe
i) ¡ C (¹ qe
1)] + 1
nC (¹ qe
1) if ¹ qe
1 <q e
i
We must note, here, that f is continuous.
Let f1 (qi)= 1
nC (qe
i),a n df2 (qi)= 1
n¡1 [C (¹ q1
1 ^ qe
i) ¡ C (¹ qe
1)]¡ 1
nC (¹ qe
1).S i n c e
C is strictly increasing, we have f2 (qi) <f 1 (qi) for each qi such that ¹ qe
1 <q e
i;
Moreover, f2 (qi)=f1 (qi) when qe
i =¹ qe
1.S i n c e C is strictly convex, the two
functions f1 and f2 are also strictly convex. Then, Lemma 6.3 con…rms that f is
strictly convex.
To conclude our proof, we shall assume that f is strictly convex for any set S
with a cardinal k<n¡1. We will show that it is also strictly convex for S having
a cardinal k. Without loss of generality, let us now assume that S = f1;:::;kg,
and ¹ qe
1 ¸ ¹ qe











































k (Ei (¹ q1)),
where Ei (¹ q1) is the i-th component of ¹ qe
1, i.e., the value ~ qi for which C1 (¹ qe
1)=
Ci (~ qe
i) holds. Combining the strict convexity of cost function C and the results
established in Lemma 6.2, we con…rm the strict convexity of function f2.




fk (qi) if ¹ qe
1 ¸ qe
i




Note that f is continuous, f2 (qi) <f k (qi) for each qi such that ¹ qe
1 <q e
i;m o r e o v e r ,
f2 (qi)=f1 (qi) when qe
i =¹ qe
1. By Lemma 6.3 we can therefore conclude that f is
strictly convex.
Remark 1. Lemma 4.3 assumes the smoothness of the cost functions. We should
point out, however, that such an assumption is only introduced to simplify the
proofs that we have presented here, but is not indispensable for the formal proofs.
In fact, Lebesgue’s Theorem guarantees that the functions we have analyzed
throughout this appendix are di¤erentiable almost everywhere. Henceforth, given
a point in which some function is not di¤erentiable, we can analyze the local be-
havior of such a function at the referred point, relative to the subgradients of the
function at that point. The question is: Which subgradient should be chosen? If
we simply consider the limit of the gradients for any succession of points, in the
function domain, as being increasing and converging to the point in question. The
reader can easily verify that this argument yields the desired results. Obviously,
if we do not assume di¤erentiability, we lose the simplicity of the proofs. We can
only hope that the reader will share our opinion that what is gained in simplicity
out-weighs any possible loss from the introduction of this additional assumption.
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